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RAISING THE FUNDS - SPENDING THE FUNDS: A 
CASE STUDY OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BOTH 
ROLES OF NGOs 
Matthew Clarke 
ABSTRACT 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) must be effective in both raising funds and 
using these funds to implement programs in order to improve the circumstances of the 
poor. This chapter presents a case study of World Vision Australia's (WVA) fundraising 
and programming responses to the Asian Tsunami. The initial stages of the fundraising 
campaign were largely unplanned and reactive. Yet WV A received over $110 million for 
its tsunami appeal in just a little over three months. This is incomparable with other 
recent large-scale disaster fundraising campaigns. The experiences of how the initial 
phases of the response were implemented are gauged through a qualitative analysis of 
interviews conducted with twenty-one staff members who completed short-term 
secondments during the initial tsunami response. These interviews extract a number of 
reflections of WVA's programming and provide a number of lessons for WVA for future 
complex humanitarian emergencies, This chapter thus reviews the effectiveness of both 
roles ofNGOs - raising funds and expending these funds to implement programs. 
INTRODUCTION 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have two important roles. NGOs must be 
effective in both raising funds and using these funds to implement programs in order to 
improve the circumstances of the poor. This chapter presents a case study of World Vision 
Australia)s (WVA) fundraising and programming responses to the Asian Tsunami. 
The vast majority of the literature surrounding the role of NGOs in international 
development focuses on the effectiveness and efficiency of their work in developing 
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countries. However, very little research has focused on the other role ofNGOs - fundraising. 
This omission is interesting as the ability of NGOs to undertake effective community 
development initiatives is predicated on their ability to raise both private and public funds to 
finance these interventions. If NGOs are unable to raise funds, they are unable to undertake 
development interventions. Yet the literature that does concern fundraising is largely limited 
to a perceived tension between marketing departments using negative images to illicit 
donations based on guilt or paternalistic emotions and the development programming 
departments trying to empower local communities (see for example Billis and MacKeith 
2004; Folwer 2002; Edwards and Fowler 2002; Edwards and Sen 2002). Whilst this 
dichotomy may exist, greater consideration of the marketing activities of NGOs is now 
required to investigate how effective NGOs have become in this 'other role'. New research is 
required to reflect and examine how programming and marketing departments in NGOs now 
work in close partnership to both educate and encourage commitment to donate and undertake 
other social action by suppoliers (both public and corporate) over the longer term. One of the 
consequences of this has been the partnerships built between NGOs and public companies, 
such as media organizations and other service providers. The strength of these partnerships 
combined with the perception of integrity surrounding NGOs has resulted in many 
commercial organizations seeking relationships with NGOs to support their fund raising 
activities, especially in times of complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE). 
This chapter will firstly present a case study of the fundraising activities in response to 
the Asian Tsunami by a single NGO in Australia - World Vision of Australia (WVA) I . It 
explores how WV A was able to effectively fundraise for the Asian Tsunami disaster without 
resorting to traditional 'appeals to pity and compassion' (Fowler 2002, p. 136), through its 
partnership with various commercial entities. As will be discussed, the initial stages of the 
fundraising campaign were largely unplanned and reactive. But having said that, senior 
managers within WV A understood the potential impact of the tsunami to be far greater than 
initially reported and based on this intuition organized the first NGO media event and 
maintained this media profile throughout the early stages of the tsunami response. WV A was 
able to draw on its programming, media and marketing experience to efficiently capture a 
large segment of the funds donated by the Australian public in response to the tsunami. WVA 
received over $110 million for its tsunami appeal in just a little over three months. This is 
incomparable with other recent large-scale disaster fundraising campaigns. 
Consideration of how these funds were spent will then be undertaken. Twenty-one staff 
members who completed short-term secondments in the relief response were interviewed to 
gauge their experiences of how the initial phases of the tsunami response were implemented. 
The interviews provide a number of lessons for WVA, and other NGOs more generally, for 
future CHEs. 
THE ASIAN TSUNAMI 
A minute or so before 8.00 am (local time) on Sunday 26 December 2004, an earthquake 
measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale occurred thirty kilometres below sea level at 3.307° N 
1 It would be of interest if similar case studies could be undertaken for other agencies so that a comparative analysis 
could be then undertaken. 
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95.947° E. The closest land mass was 255 kilometres SSE at Banda Aceh, Indonesia. This 
was the fourth largest earthquake recorded since 1900, but the longest - lasting 10 minutes. 
The fault rapture was over 12,000 kilometres long. "The quake occurred where two of the 
giant plates that form the surface of the earth ground together. At that spot the Eurasian plat 
was pulled down by the descending Indo-Australian plate. The quake released the edge of the 
Eurasian plat, which sprang up, lifting the ocean floor and sending the sea water off in the 
giant wave that killed so many" CAP 2005, p. 14). The resulting tsunami directly affected 11 
countries, killing up to 300,000 people and displacing over one million more. The eleven 
countries in South Asia and East Africa directly affected by the resulting tsunami were 
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Singapore, Somalia, Tanzania, 
Seychelles, and Kenya. Banda Aceh province of Indonesia and Sri Lanka were the worst 
affected. 
Before 9.00 am (local time) the tsunami reached land at Banda Aceh and Southern 
Thailand. Within Two hours, it had reached Sri Lanka, the Maldives and India. The force of 
the tsunami caused immediate destruction and death. Sweeping all before its path, the rising 
ocean razed natural and human-made structures. No warnings systems were in place and local 
popUlations were caught completely unprepared for the resulting tsunami. The tsunami ranged 
in height between 3-10 metres throughout the region. On its eventual retreat, the extent of the 
damage clearly became evident. In addition to the human devastation, the geography of these 
countries was changed, with land being dragged into the sea, and shorelines shifted hundreds 
of metres inland. The damage to human and natural capital was enormous. While initial relief 
interventions were vital, so too are the now longer-term development and reconstruction 
interventions being implemented across all the countries affected. These interventions are 
only possible because of the funds raised by NOOs and funds pledged by governments. 
THE FUNDRAISING RESPONSE 
This section provides a day-to-day account of the unfolding events surrounding WVA's 
fundraising events. They are a synthesis of a number of key informant interviews undertaken 
with key WV A staff involved with the marketing and programming response. 
The first reports to WV A of the tsunami were received by the Relief Manager in the late 
afternoon of Sunday 26 December. These reports were sketchy and did not indicate the 
magnitude of the devastation that had occurred. No formal action was undertaken by WV A 
on this day. More accurate reports became available on Monday 27 December. These reports 
suggested that the number of deaths was 4000 with thousands more injured and up to one 
million people directly affected. The Asian Tsunami featured on the front page of The 
Australian newspaper with other reports filling a second page. News of the tsunami featured 
on the front page of The Australian everyday, until fatal bushfires occurred South Australia 
on the 11 January, 2005. This represents an unprecedented 16 days of a single event 
maintaining front page coverage. While the full extent of the devastation was still not evident, 
an intuitive feeling by key WV A staff (in Relief and Marketing) suggested that this was a 
disaster of significant proportion and had the very real potential of quickly becoming aCHE. 
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Table 1. Tsunami Reports in The Australian newspaper 
Date Reported Dead Pages 
27 December 4,000 Front + 1 
28 December 22,876 Front +4 
29 December No specific figure highlighted Front + 5 
30 December 69,639 Front + 6 
31 December 86,000 Front +4 
1-2 January 126,000 Front + 13 
3 January 130,000 Front + 4 
4 January 144,000 Front + 5 
5 January No specific figure highlighted Front + 4 
6 January 150,000 Front + 4 
7 January 150,000 Front + 4 
8-9 January ] 53,000 Front + 10 
10 January 150,000 Front + 3 
11 January No specific figure highlighted Front + 3 
Source: author's own review 
Based on this intuitive reaction, it was immediately decided to hold a press conference 
stating WVA's intentions of sending the newly appointed WVA CEO directly to Sri Lanka to 
visit the affected areas. An appeal for public donations was also simultaneously launched. 
The media team at WVA was assisted in this process by senior staff; however lower-level 
marketing staff on leave was not required to return to work at this stage. The subsequent press 
conference was well attended by the media. This was due to a number of coinciding events: 
• this was the first tsunami-related press conference held by an NGO; 
• Costello has a wide recognition factor in Victoria (due to long standing involvement 
in social justice issues, such as gambling) and growing national recognition (based 
on his brother, the Federal Treasure - The Rt. Hon; Peter Costello); and 
• the three week period following Christmas is traditionally a slow-media period due to 
the prominence of sporting events and number of senior politicians and other public 
figures taking personal leave 
Due to this media lull and the growing awareness of the extent of the tsunami damage, a 
number of media outlets sent representatives to accompany WV A CEO to Sri Lanka. In 
addition to the accompanying media, WVA CEO was available to local (and international 
media) at all times during his stay in Sri Lanka. Further, other WV A media spokespeople 
were available from the 27 December onwards to respond to any further media queries. Also 
on the 27 December, the ANZ Bank directly approached WV A and offered their services as a 
collection point for people wishing to donate to WVA2. They further suggested that this offer 
would be exclusive (in order to avoid confusion to their customers) effectively excluding 
other NOOs collecting funds through the bank. WVA did not commit immediately to this 
offer as previous practice was to avoid actively seeking donations through banks as it reduced 
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the opportunity to collect donor information for future marketing purposes. Within twenty 
minutes of this offer from the ANZ, the National Australia Bank (NAB) also contacted WVA 
offering the same exclusive arrangements. It was becoming increasingly obvious that the 
effects of the tsunami were greater than originally suspected and that a generous public 
response was likely, WVA decide to accept the two banks' offers and forego collecting donor 
information3• Having informed each of the banks of their competitor's offer, the banks 
accepted a co-operative position. These discussions took place on the 27 December, which 
was a bank holiday (in lieu of Boxing Day). This allowed time to prepare both signage and 
procedures to be ready in every ANZ and NAB branch on the 28 December, the first day of 
banking business since Christmas Eve. Due to the branch coverage of both companies, the 
public response was immediately overwhelming beating all initial expectations. 
From December 28 (Tuesday), the WV A CEO began to be featured in nearly all print 
coverage of the tsunami as he was the only high profile Australian within the affected areas. 
Due to the continuing media coverage and prominence of WV A in this reporting, the WV A 
call centre received more donations in its first two hours of operation on 28 December than 
the total donations received through the call centre of any previous CHE campaign. Within 
two days, $5 million had been pledged through the call centre. For the first time, the WVA 
website also became a significant portal for the general public wishing to donate to WV A. On 
the first day $2 million was donated. In total nearly one quarter of WVA 's public donations 
were made on the internet. WV A also raised funds through SMS texting for the first time. In 
the past, discussions with telecommunication firms were unsuccessful due to claims of 
expense and technical difficulties. However, given the environment following the Asian 
Tsunami, an initial reque~t from WV A to Optus to investigate fundraising through texting 
was quickly implemented resulting in $2 million in raised funds. 
The direct marketing team also began preparing a major mail-out to general supporters. A 
mail-out was not scheduled, and so production and design teams worked to stringent 
deadlines. Most supporters received the mail-out on January 5, 2005. A targeted mail-out was 
also prepared for pre-identified high givers or wealthy supporters. Total funds raised from the 
direct marketing campaign were $8 million. 
The first full WVA stakeholders meeting (made-up of Relief, Media and Marketing 
managers) was held on Wednesday 29 December. Following this meeting, a second meeting 
was held to disseminate information to the wider organization in order to develop a strategy 
to support WVA's response to the tsunami., The wider meeting included representatives from 
Asia and Pacific Rim development, banking, major donors, corporate sponsors and web 
design teams. In addition, on Wednesday 29 December, Channel 7 approaches WVA seeking 
to exclusively promote WVA (without seeking WVA to cease co-operating with other media 
outlets). They felt that their viewers were confused with an array of NOO contact numbers 
and appeals and that by focussing solely on one NOG, a stronger message could be conveyed. 
WV A and Channel 7 had a pre-existing relationship, but it was not strong enough to expect 
this offer. It was immediately agreed that the Channel 7 breakfast program, Sunrise, would be 
broadcast live from WVA offices the following Friday (31 December). The entire program 
was dedicated to supporting the work of WV A in tsunami affected areas and eliciting 
2 ANZ and WV A had a prior commercial relationship. 
3 In actual fact, the banks were able to coUect and supply this data - albeit with certain caveats for its on-going use 
byWVA. 
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financial support from the public. Due to various time zones, the call centre received non-stop 
calls from 6.00 am to 11.00 am ESDT and raised $4 million. Similar saturation attention 
followed in the evening news program. WVA's phone number was exclusively listed by 
Channel 7 whenever the Asian Tsunami Disaster was reported. 
The WV A CEO was still in Sri Lanka at this time and providing interviews to all media 
outlets, both domestically and internationally on behalf of the World Vision partnership. 
During Thursday 30 December, Channel 7 first raised the idea of initiating a fundraising 
concert. Again, in order to reduce confusion within the giving public, it proposed that WV A 
would be the sole recipient of the money raised and the sole NGO mentioned and promoted 
during the concert. A final decision regarding the viability of the concert was not reached 
until Tuesday (4 January). 
From 1 January (Saturday) to 4 January (Tuesday), WVA was approached by the various 
media outlets and companies also seeking to exclusively promote WV A without expecting 
any obligations in return. The reason offered by these organisations was to minimise public 
confusion and thus maximise donations. The final decision to hold the fundraising concert 
was made only on Tuesday 4 January. Tickets to the concert, to be held at the Sydney Opera 
House sold out immediately they were released. Channel 7 then also sought co-operation with 
the other broadcasters (Channel 10 and 9 and various radio stations) to ensure the success of 
the concert resulting in simultaneous broadcast on all commercial TV stations and a large 
number of radio stations. WVA was not involved in the actual production of the concert. 
Excluding the costs associated with the direct marketing campaign, the total sum of 
WV A fundraising expenditure to this point was $2000 (in order to hire a sound booth to 
record a (no-fee) voice-over. Yet $20 million had been raised. 
During the weekend of 1 and 2 January, WVA was approached by the Australian Cricket 
Board (ACB). The ACB had been holding internal discussions over the previous week 
regarding their response to the tsunami. The ACB had decided that an international match 
featuring cricketers from Asia versus the rest of the world would be a suitable and appropriate 
fund-raising event. Unlike other organisations, a relationship between the ACB and WVA 
pre-existed, based on support over the previous decade of WV A through various charity 
events involving the Australian cricket team both domesti.cally and internationally. As with 
the Sydney Opera House concert, WVA were not directly involved in the planning, staging or 
production of this event. Its role was limited to being the sole beneficiary of all funds raised 
of both ticket sales and associated fund-raising on the day and follow-up events, such as 
auctioning the uniforms and other memorabilia, etc of participating players and officials. 
During this time, publicly-listed companies as well as private philanthropists were beginning 
to feel pressure (both from their own employees and shareholders and the general public) and 
began making large donations. Kerry Packer's personal $3 million donation announced 
during the MCG cricket match was the largest individual donation though others also donated 
significant sums, such as Dick Pratt's donation of $1 million. By this stage, WVA had 
received $38 million and began to discuss the continued appropriateness of being the sole 
NGO associated with these large national events. WVA suggested to Channel 9 that perhaps a 
second large NGO might be involved in the MCG cricket match. Channel 9 declined this 
offer, again stating that an exclusive focus would maximise donations by minimising 
confusion within the general public. 
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The Concert and Cricket Match (8 January and 10 January) 
The World Vision Reach outfor Asia concert was held on the steps of the Sydney Opera 
House on January 8, 2006. Over $20 million was raised during the concert and associated 
telethon carried live all major commercial television stations and a number of FM radio 
stations. Between 6.30 pm on January 8 to 3.00 am on January 9,160,677 calls were received 
and 8019 web transactions completed. Two days later, on 10 January the Asia vs. World 
Cricket Match was played at the Melbourne Cricket Ground. Over $14 million dollars was 
raised during the game. Between 3.00 pm on 10 January and 3.00 on 11 January 25,600 calls 
were received and 1,687 web transactions completed. 
SUMMARY 
WV A raised over $111.3 million in its Asian Tsunami Appeal. This level of public 
support was unprecedented. Direct fundraising expenses were also negligible as WVA was 
the exclusive recipient of a number of large-scale, externally conceived and produced 
fundraising events. In past WV A fundraising campaign, around 90% of support comes from 
prexisting supporters. This clearly did not occur with the Asian Tsunami Appeal, with the 
majority of support coming from first time donors. During the first two weeks following the 
tsunami, the Marketing Department worked closely with the Relief Team. Due to the 
'organic' response of the public, the Marketing Department was able to concentrate on 
primarily disseminating information to various media outlets rather than spending resources 
seeking to raise public awareness (as with most relief fundraising appeals). However, the 
manner in which the funds were raised had the effect of giving prominence to WV A within 
the public sphere almost to the full exclusion of other NOOs seeking to raise funds from the 
Australian public. In the final week of December 2004, following the tsunami, WV A was 
specifically mentioned in print media that had a combined circulation of 2,081,995. In 
January this figure increased to 9,561,169. In relation to the World Vision Reach out for Asia 
concert, WVA was mentioned in media with a circulation of 1,887,258. Whilst the circulation 
of media mentioning WVA in relation to the Asia vs. The World Cricket Match was 
9,552,807. 
THE IMPLEMENTATION RESPONSE 
WVA's programming response was almost as immediate as its fund raising response. 
Expectations of the impact the programming response should have on those affected by the 
tsunami also grew in line with the amount of funds being raised. Given the amount finally 
raised, expectations were thus significant. Within days of the Asian Tsunami, an international 
relief effort was in operation with over 200 international NGOs (WV A among them) and 
many more local NOOs providing assistance. In fact, the response required outstripped most 
NGOs staffing capacity, resulting in many 'non-relief' staff being deployed on short notice 
without experience or training. It should be noted though that the number of dedicated NGO 
workers (whether relief specialist or not) were outnumbered many times over - in the initial 
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phases of the response at least - by surviving members of the local communities, local 
government officials, as well as expatriates offering their assistance (including those who had 
being holidaying in the affected areas or travelled to the affected areas expressly to offer 
support). However, unlike the surviving members of local communities, local government 
officials, and expatriates offering assistance, NOO deployed staff were responsible for 
extremely large and well-funded relief interventions, including food distribution, medical 
care, temporary camps, and provision of other needs for those affected. The responsibilities 
carried by NGO staff were therefore significant. 
There is a developing body of literature on the failures and successes of the programming 
response to the tsunami. These evaluations tend to be either official reports concerning 
matters of donor funding expenditure, -infrastructure and material development and general 
statistical analyses or reports and articles written and produced by NGOs themselves that 
discuss their own specific programs (for example, ActionAid 2006; Oxfam International, 
2006; UNDP, 2006; Caritas Australia, 2005; Brennan and Rimba, 2005; Doocy et aI, 2006). 
Having noted its fundraising activities of WV A, this section reports on the experiences of 21 
'non-relief staff deployed to tsunami-affected areas by WVA for short periods of time. Using 
a qualitative research methodology, it distils a number of issues that constrained the capacity 
of these staff to respond optimally. In this regard, it provides the chance to learn from the 
extreme circumstances unleashed by the tsunami and therefore the opportunity to improve 
responses to future CHEs. 
The Unique Perspective of Short-Term, Non-Relief Specialists 
There is limited qualitative research within the literature that is concerned specifically 
with the organisational responses of international NGOs to CHEs (see Trice 2003 for a 
summary). This current research is also unusual in that it focuses on the experiences of staff 
who undertook short-term assignments only. The few previous studies undertaken (see; 
Cardozo and Salama 2002; De Haan 1994; Eriksson et al. 2001) have focussed on the 
experiences of staff in longer-term appointments in humanitarian emergencies with a 
particular focus on the stress and trauma faced by these workers. Rather than being 
introspective, the purpose of this particular study was to gauge experiences of external 
factors, such as organizational governance and staffing procedures. This external focus is 
valid though as the literature indicates that it is largely these factors that impact on personal 
stress and trauma (Fawcett 2003). 
WVA deployed twenty-six staff to tsunami affected areas between January to September 
2005 in total and twenty-one were interviewed for this study. Approximately half of the 
participants had been involved in relief work prior to the tsunami, but were not classified as 
'relief-specialists', the others had been recruited from elsewhere in the organisation or were 
short-term consultants employed by the organisation. These staff identified three main issues 
that affected their capacity to respond optimally: 1) governance at relief operation sites; 2) 
infrastructure and implementation of systems; and 3) selection of deployed staff and their 
preparation and support. These findings find resonance in similar evaluations undertaken for 
this and previous international responses to CHEs (see Telford and Crosgrave 2006, and 
Borton and Brusset 1996 on the Rwandan experience). 
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Who's the Boss? 
Staff clearly identified the importance of organisational governance to their ability to 
respond effectively. This emphasis is not unexpected as 'the available evidence clearly 
demonstrates that aid workers assign most causes of stress to organisational factors such as 
team relationships, leadership, clarity of mission objectives, and agency structure' (Fawcett 
2003, p. 135). As part of an international partnership, the Australian staff was working with 
counterparts from both the local national offices as well as from the international partnership 
office. Not knowing clearly who was in charge impacted on their ability to respond 
effectively. For instance, decisions made by one person could be over-turned by another, 
leaving staff feeling very confused and frustrated. In some instances, staff reported having to 
work to several supervisors. For example, one interviewee stated 
'you'll be working with one person and then come to an agreement and then 
somebody else will come in and say, that's not impOliant." you work with the relief 
manager or the IT manager and make a decision and then run with that, assume that's 
what been done and then find out a day ortwo later that." (a more senior manager) has 
come in and said, "no, we can't do that" for whatever reason.' 
Another interviewee reported added: '[I was] there working in the local team in an 
emergency capacity so I had a local boss but then I had a regional boss and then I also had an 
international boss, so it was confusing.' In other cases, instead of multiple bosses, there was 
seemingly no boss and a lack of formal leadership. An interviewed staff member found that 
his first week in Aceh was highly unproductive because 'it was just too unclear who was 
responsible for what in that particular area.' Stable leadership, agreed reporting structures and 
delegation of authority is important in effective relief interventions. 
What Do I Have and How Do I Get What I Need? 
Interviewed staff reported difficulties in accessing basic infrastructure early in the 
response and not having in place standard systems that would facilitate their work. These 
systems and strategies were of two kinds: first, a general organisational plan put in place at 
times of disaster to deal with immediate ways of working and, second, the strategies 
developed to deal with both the local crisis circumstances and over time. Central to 
difficulties early in the tsunami response and critical to both general plans and also specific 
localised responses were the lack of basic equipment and infrastructure to respond effectively. 
These problems were more acute in Aceh than Sri Lanka. As one interviewee responded, 
"In Aceh, it was more difficult because of the lack of infrastructure ... I was celiainly 
surprised that the first plane load didn't have satellite dishes so that we could get satellite 
broadband ... and a range of other systems that I would have thought pretty common 
across a category 3 disaster". 
This interviewee concluded that 'when you can't get internet and access to some of that 
sort of stuff weeks after the disaster, then there's something wrong'. However these concerns 
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must be viewed in light of the overall destruction caused by the tsunami. Expectations of 
broadband internet access, for example, may be naive when whole towns have been 
destroyed. But the lack of infrastructure support did negatively impact efforts to establish 
temporary regional offices. 
Concerns were also expressed about certain organisational systems that were being 
implemented and their usefulness in such extreme conditions. In particular, several 
interviewed staff indicated that 'Some of the processes that they put in place were not 
relevant to a relief situation'. Another staff member similarly highlighted that accountability 
systems which might be appropriate in a development situation, simply hindered his work in 
Aceh by noting that: 
"The Jakarta staff were wonderful people but their mind was in development mode, 
their mind was saying 'well, we normally get three quotes. Can you nick down the street 
and get three quotes?' ... then you go down and get three quotes and the [mance people 
would say 'hang on one of these quotes is not for the same item, you've got to go and get 
it again'. 
Am I Ready to Go? 
Many large international NGOs have dedicated relief specialists on standby for 
immediate deployment to CHEs. Yet the size of the tsunami required a greater human 
resources response than just these staff. Deploying 'non-relief staff was therefore necessary, 
but also very urgent. Interviewed staff acknowledged that the timing of the tsunami (people 
were away or otherwise on holidays over Christmas and New Year) hampered their 
organisation's capacity to provide appropriate briefings. It was apparent however, that there 
were also inconsistencies in the level of information different staff members were provided 
with; some were provided with a reasonable level of background information prior to leaving 
Australia, others reported that they went without any briefings. More importantly, staff 
members highlighted the importance of having a briefing session in the field or being able to 
talk to someone who had just left the field as crucial background to being able to 'hit the 
ground running'. In particular, some staff stressed the importance of briefing around cross-
cultural awareness. For example, one interviewed staff, who represented the views of many 
noted: 
"When we are going into a country it is their operations we are going into ... these 
guys have their own constitutional agreement, their own board and suddenly the tsunami 
comes and the tsunami brings with it a tsunami of foreigners and, at one point of time, we 
were from fifteen different countries ... one has to recognise that we are going into a 
completely different culture, different sensitivities have to be followed and to be aware of 
those sensitivities, cultural protocols, the tensions, the social political expectations". 
The extent to which emotional support and debriefing in the field were provided by the 
organisation also seemed to vary. One interviewed staff member suggested that it would 
certainly have improved his experience if such support had been more formalised. 
Importantly, he noted that for someone with less experience than himself in relief situations, 
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this would be essential to their coping in what would always be a trying environment. 
Another said that, while he did not feel unsupported, it was mostly his own personal resources 
of having had previous experience of working in these kinds of circumstances that got him 
through. But the question that remains unanswered is "why send inexperienced staff in such a 
complex situation in the first placeT 
In contrast, other team members described themselves as having been well supported 
organisationally during their time in tsunami-affected areas. Members of the team of 
consultant engineers who went to Sri Lanka also acknowledged that they had been well-
supported, both logistically and by having systems in place to speak with each other and 
through a mid-term briefing with their team leader. 
If it Ever Happens Again ... 
Whilst the size of the tsunami was unprecedented in terms of geographical spread and 
devastation, the issues reported by the interviewed staff (governance, systems and 
preparation) are relevant to any large-scale CHE and therefore are relevant to any NOO 
undertaking relief operations. Given the prominent role NGOs have in implementing relief 
interventions (on behalf of bi- and multi-lateral donors as well as using their own publicly 
raised funds) it is incumbent on these organisations to consistently seek to improve the 
capacity of their own staff to respond effectively to CHEs. Hopefully, a CHE of similar size 
to the tsunami will not occur again. But such wishful thinking is not sufficient in itself. 
International NGOs must be prepared for the worse and listen to the experiences of those who 
have seen the worst first hand. No doubt this is occurring and NGOs will continue to focus on 
how to improve the capacity of their staff for the future. Hopefully this attempt to amplify the 
voices of short-term non-relief specialists will assist these important efforts. 
CONCLUSION 
The Asian Tsunami was a disaster, thankfully unprecedented in recent times. The public 
response was also unprecedented. WV A was favourably placed to receive a large portion of 
public funds raised due to the exclusive relationships it formed with key media, banking and 
other commercial organisations. The reason provided by these organisations was to present a 
single entity to the general public to avoid confusion, a sense of competitiveness amongst 
fundraising NGOs, thus avoided dilution of support. The WV A Marketing Department 
managed relationships effectively and efficiently in a very intense environment. It is likely 
that the actions of the Marketing Department will have positive flow-on consequences for 
future fundraising campaigns. It is important that this other role played by NGOs is 
considered when analysing the effectiveness of aid. The literature is yet to fully incorporate 
this new role of managing relationships played by marketing departments in fundraising 
campaigns. It is no longer about eliciting donations based on guilt, but providing information 
and opportunities for the general public to respond to an increasingly localised world. This 
leads to more effective fundraising - which is one role ofNGOs. 
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The other role ofNGOs is programming. The programming response to the tsunami was 
undertaken in trying circumstances. Given the size of the destruction and devastation, WV A, 
like other NGOs, faced many difficulties in implementing activities in the most efficient 
manner. Three main issues important in responding effectively are: 1) governance at relief 
operation sites; 2) infrastructure and implementation of systems; and 3) selection of deployed 
staff and their preparation and support. Such issues have been reported by other organisations 
during large CHEs. Thus, before NGOs can effectively spend the money, they need to 
effectively raise funds. This case study suggests that agencies such as WV A are able to 
undertake both with varying levels of success. 
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